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justice and confusion of the functions of judge and jury would be
avoided without depriving criminal defendants of the opportunity
to have the court consider their motions for the directed verdicts
-a control device basic to trial by jury.5
Jean Talley
DISPOSITION OF WITHERSPOON-TYPE CASES
The United States Supreme Court, in Witherspoon v. Illinois,1
declared unconstitutional the successful challenge for cause of
prospective jurors who maintained conscientious or religious
scruples against the death penalty. Stating that the exclusion
of such persons left a jury prejudiced against the defendant on
the penalty issue, the Court voided Witherspoon's sentence of
death but affirmed his conviction of guilt. The actual disposition
of Witherspoon, however, was not clear,2 with the result that
state courts have been far from uniform in disposing of Witherspoon-type cases. The states have found themselves faced with
the question of what to do with defendants whose convictions
are valid, but who may no longer be executed on the basis of the
convicting jury's penalty determination. The Supreme Court of
California has affirmed the conviction of such a defendant, and
ordered a new trial on the penalty issue only under California's
existing bifurcated trial procedure.3 The other states which have
had to cope with the problem do not have statutes allowing bifurcated trials, and have been forced to formulate ad hoc techniques. The Georgia court 4 affirmed the conviction and ordered
a new trial on the penalty issue only, stating that it had no authority to enter a sentence other than death unless it had a jury
recommendation of mercy. The North Carolina Supreme Court 5
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 6 on the other hand,
reversed the convictions as well as the sentences and ordered
complete new trials. The Mississippi Supreme Court 7 ordered
56. The court should take this step at the earliest possible time, since
unless the trial judge assigns as the reason for denying the directed verdict
the Hudson rationale, the defendant's motion would simply be denied without recourse to effective appeal on this point.
1. 391 U.S. 510 (1968), noted in 29 LA. L. Rav. 381 (1969).
2. Witherspoon apparently was never retried by an Illinois court.
3. In re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968).
4. Massey v. Smith, 224 Ga. 721, 164 S.E.2d 730 (1968) (on habeas corpus);
Miller v. State, 224 Ga. 627, 163 S.E.2d 730 (1968) (on appeal).
5. State v. Spence, 274 N.C. 536, 164 S.E.2d 593 (1968) (on appeal).
6. Ex parte Bryan, 434 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (on habeas
corpus); Ellison v. State, 432 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (on appeal).
7. Rouse v. State, 222 So.2d 145 (Miss. 1969) (on appeal).
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that the case be reversed as to penalty only, unless the trial
judge, with the district attorney's consent, elected to reduce to
life imprisonment, without the intervention of a jury.
The Supreme Court of LoUisiana has also been called upon,
on appeal, to resolve this problem. In State v. Turner"and State
v. Benjamin,9 the Louisiana court ordered new trials on the guilt
issue as well as the penalty issue. In Turner, the state, in applying for rehearing, 0 urged that the court should have only annulled the death sentence and remanded for sentencing to life
imprisonment. The application was denied. When the state
urged a similar contention in Benjamin," it too was rejected.
The court, unfortunately, assigned no reasons for disposing of
the cases in the manner it did.
Two reasons for the Louisiana Supreme Court's decisions
can, however, be postulated. The first is that the court is going
beyond the Witherspoon holding and invalidating the convictions
as well as the penalties on the ground that the juries were prejudiced on the issue of guilt. This seems improbable. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana, when compared to the United States Supreme
Court, has had a tendency to be conservative in matters of criminal procedure. 12 It would be the first state court to so hold,18 and
it is doubtful that it would be taking such a momentous step
without discussing the issue. Moreover, there is language in the
court's opinion from which it may be inferred that the court will
not order new determinations of guilt in those cases coming to
it on habeas corpus.1 4 A second and more probable reason for the
8. 253 La. 763, 220 So.2d 67 (1969).
9. 254 La. 49, 222 So.2d 853 (1969).
10. State v. Turner, 253 La. 763, 767, 220 So.2d 67, 69 (1969).
11. State v. Benjamin. 2.54 La. 49. 222 So.2d 853 (1969).
12. See, e.g., State v. White, 254 La. 889, 223 So.2d 843 (1969) (refusal to
require unanimous verdict in non-capital felony case); State v. Jones, 251
La. 431, 204 So.2d 775 (1967) (refusal to grant jury trial for offense for
which penalty did not exceed six months, In absence of United States
Supreme Court directive).
13. At least four state courts have grappled with the theory that
exclusion of scrupled jurors leaves a jury prejudiced on the guilt issue, and
all have rejected it. See State v. Madden, 104 Ariz. 111, 449 P.2d 39 (1969);
In re Arguello, 452 P.2d 921, 76 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). State v. William, 275
N.C. 77, 165 S.E.2d 481 (1969); Nelson v. State, 245 A.2d 606 (Mt. Ct. Spec.
App. 1968).
14. State v. Turner, 253 La. 763, 767, 200 So.2d 67, 69 (1969): "The application for rehearing urges that in disposing of this case on appeal we should
have only annulled the death sentence and remanded for sentence to life
imprisonment instead of reversing the conviction, annulling the sentence,
and remanding for a new trial. The application is denied. However, that
portion of our decree which reversed the conviction and remanded for a
new trial is not intended to, nor does it, apply to those cases where the
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decisions is that the Supreme Court of Louisiana felt it had no
authority on appeal to reduce the sentence to life imprisonment.
Other state courts have announced their inability to take such
action, 15 and it is doubtful that the Louisiana court could do so
under Louisiana law. 16 The Louisiana Supreme Court may have
authority under the supervisory powers granted to it by the
Louisiana Constitution 7 to remove the death sentences from such
defendants in non-appellate proceedings.' 8
State courts have understandably had difficulty in obeying
the ruling of Witherspoon while still conforming to their states'
procedural rules. The writer submits that the approach which
may be inferred from Turner and Benjamin is a proper one: for
unconstitutionally sentenced defendants who appeal, new trials
'should be ordered; while those defendants who can no longer
appeal should have their death sentences vacated and should
be remanded to prison. 10
At the outset, it must be emphasized that Witherspoon was a
very unusual decision. It was the first case in which the United
States Supreme Court invalidated a death sentence as having
been imposed without due process of law, and yet affirmed as
entirely untainted the conviction upon which that sentence was
conviction and sentence have become final after appellate review or by
elapse of time for appeal." When it quoted this passage in Benjamin, the
court emphasized the words "on appeal." See State v. Benjamin, 254 La. 49,
n.3, 222 So.2d 853, 855 n.3 (1969).
15. See notes 4-7 supra. These courts have not, however, made any distinction between disposition on appeal and disposition on habeas corpus.
16. A. CODE CalM. P. art. 817: "In a capital case the jury may qualify
its verdict of guilty with the addition of the words 'without capital punishment,' in which case the punishment shall be imprisonment at hard labor
for life."
It has been said that a death sentence is mandatory if the jury does not
qualify Its verdict. State v. Iles, 201 La. 398, 9 So.2d 601 (1942). See also
Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Procedure: A Critical Appraisal, 14 LA. L. Rmv.
11, 32-33 (1954).
It has generally been stated that a reviewing court may not reduce a
jury's determination of penalty without statutory authority. See L. ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERIcA 101-21 (1939). For a recent discussion of the
question, see Comment, 14 N.Y.L.F. 378 (1968) and the authorities cited
therein.
17. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
18. The Louisiana Supreme Court has said that if a lower court arbitrarily
imposed a sentence, it (the Supreme Court) would, under its supervisory
power, prohibit the execution of that sentence on the ground that due process
had not been observed. Pizzolato v. Cataldo, 202 La. 675, 12 So.2d 677 (1943).
19. An additional question, not answered by Witherspoon, is what sentence these defendants are to serve. Are they to be confined on Death Row,
or are they "lifers"?
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based." This dichotomy has created a unique legal limbo in
which many defendants guilty of capital crimes are under invalid sentences. Witherspoon allows the states to retain these
defendants in custody but forbids their execution. An unconstitutionally sentenced defendant who was constitutionally convicted some time ago should not, of course, be released. But must
the state grant such a defendant a complete new trial and run
the serious risk of having him escape conviction because evidence
has grown stale or is no longer at hand?
Must the state even grant such a defendant a new trial on
the penalty issue only, at considerable expense and inconvenience to the state and its jurors? This is unnecessary. With
respect to defendants who can no longer appeal, the answer to
the states' dilemma of what to do with Witherspoon-type cases
lies in the writ of habeas corpus. (Witherspoon itself was a
habeas corpus case.) 21 The history and nature of the writ of
20. In Frady v. United States, 348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 909 (1965), appellants' convictions of first degree murder were affirmed, but their death sentences were set aside with directions that each
appellant be resentenced to life imprisonment on verdicts of guilty of first
degree murder. The court cited 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1948), a federal appeals
statute, as authority for this manner of disposition. The writer has found
no other case in which the death sentence was vacated but the conviction
affirmed.
21. State habeas corpus relief was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court
In People v. Witherspoon, 36 Ill. 2d 471, 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967). The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
Had the petitioner sought relief under the federal habeas corpus statute,
It would appear that the United States Supreme Court would have had authority to vacate Witherspoon's death sentence and remand him to custody
without requiring any further proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1948) grants
federal courts the authority to dispose of habeas corpus cases "as law and
justice require." While it had previously been held that habeas corpus would
not issue from a federal court unless immediate physical release from confinement were possible (McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934)), the Supreme
Court has recently given the federal statute a more liberal interpretation by
disavowing the McNally holding in a case involving a defendant serving
consecutive sentences. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968)(quoting with approval Judge Haynesworth's rejection of the McNally rule as a "doctrinaire
approach"). There would seem to be little difficulty in extending this holding
to a case where the petitioner was validly convicted and therefore not entitled to release, but was entitled to have his death sentence removed.
Even before Peyton, at least one federal court recognized that the writ
should be granted even if immediate physical release were not possible. In
Dennis v. Dees, 278 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. La. 1968), a state prisoner already on
death row was found guilty of the murder of a fellow inmate and given a
second death sentence. The petitioner was tried while wearing a striped
prison uniform and leg Irons. The court held that such treatment was violative of due process and warranted habeas corpus relief. Without mentioning McNally specifically, or the federal statute, Judge West said: "The
Court Is aware of the fact that ordinarily habeas corpus will not lie when
to grant it would not result in the complete release of the petitioner. But an
exception to this rule must be made where, as here, habeas corpus Is sought
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habeas corpus support the technique of remand to custody free
of the death sentence without having a new penalty determination. The writ developed as an instrument for the vindication
of the right of personal liberty, whenever that liberty was
restrained by illegal means.22 It was, and is, issued to determine the legality of the restraint upon the petitioner. The writ
was sent to the one holding the petitioner in custody, ordering
him to produce the prisoner and give the reason for his detention "that the court ...may examine into it's [sic] validity [,J
and according to the circumstances of the case may discharge,
admit to bail, or remand the prisoner" 23 (emphasis added). If
the petitioner was imprisoned under court order, the purpose
of the writ was to examine the jurisdiction of the court which
ordered the imprisonment.2 4 If the court lacked jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction to render the particular judgment,23 the
petitioner was entitled to be released. It was said that if the
court rendered a judgment only part of which was null for
lack of jurisdiction, "the whole will not be void, but only such
part as is in excess of the powers of the court," if "the valid
and invalid parts are independent of each other. '26 The concept
of jurisdiction was eventually expanded, with the United States
Supreme Court holding, for example, that a court which had
jurisdiction of the case at the outset of the trial could lose 2it7
when the defendant's constitutional rights were violated.
Finally, the Court "abandoned the overstrained jurisdictional
to release the petitioner not from incarceration in the penitentiary, but from
the execution of a death sentence. In such a case, petitioner has the right
to have his petition for habeas corpus heard and determined even though,
if granted, he is still subject to continued incarceration for a prior conviction." Id. at 359.
22. See F. FERRIS & F. FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES § 4 (1926);
R. HURD, HABEAS CORPUS 129-32 (1876); R. SOKOL, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL HABEAS

CORPUS § 1 (1965); 2 T. SPELLING, INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES § 1152 (1901).
23. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *133. See also W. CHURCH, HABEAS
CORPUS § 106 (1886); F. FERRIS & F. FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES § 1

(1926); R. HURD, HABEAS CORPUS 230-31 (1876); Glass, Historical Aspects of
Habeas Corpus, 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 55, 60-61 (1934).

24. "In all habeas corpus proceedings the ultimate question is one of
jurisdiction and power." F. FERRIS & F. FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES
§ 18 (1926). See also W. CHURCH, HABEAS CORPUS §§ 222-27 (1886); 2 T. SPELLING, INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES § 1152 (1901).
25. F. FERRIS & F. FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES § 19

(1926).

26. 1 A. BAILEY, HABEAS CORPUS AND SPECIAL REMEDIES 169 (1913).

27. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob domination of the trial).
See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (court's failure to provide
counsel as required by Sixth Amendment caused it to lose jurisdiction);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (knowing use of perjured testimony).
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theory"28 and held that the issuance of the writ from federal
courts was not limited to cases involving jurisdictional defects,
but extended also to those cases where the conviction had been
29
in disregard of the constitutional rights of the defendant. It
can be seen, therefore, that the writ which originally served to
test the jurisdiction of the court to impose a judgment affecting
the prisoner today issues on many additional grounds. Still, the
s
vindication of due process has always been the writ's function.8
"[T]he nature and purpose of habeas corpus have remained
remarkably constant."'
A defendant who has been sentenced to death by a jury
from which jurors who have conscientious scruples against the
death penalty have been excluded, has been sentenced without
due process of law. A defendant sentenced in this way, and who
has not appealed, should be granted relief from the death sentence by way of the Great Writ.82 In this way, his rights are
protected, and the state is spared the danger of acquittal by
reason of present inadequacy of the evidence, or the time,
expense, and difficulties of a second penalty determination.M
Where appeals have been taken, defendants sentenced to death
by juries declared improper by Witherspoon will apparently
continue to be given complete new trials, or, in those jurisdicWRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 180 (1963).
29. Id.
30. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963).
31. Id.
32. The Louisiana statute dealing with habeas corpus when the petitioner
is imprisoned by virtue of a court order (LA. CODs CRiM. P. art. 362 (9))
provides only for the discharge of the prisoner convicted without due process
of law. Comment (i) thereunder makes clear, however, that the drafters intended to broaden the authority of Louisiana courts to issue the writ and
thereby limit federal court intervention in cases involving state law. Understandably, the legislature did not foresee the unusual situation created
by Witherspoon. It is suggested that if the legislature could possibly have
anticipated the problem, it would have provided habeas corpus relief to
remedy the Injustice to Witherspoon-type petitioners. For a discussion of
LA. CODE CiRi. P. art. 362(9), see Bennett, The 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure, 27 LA. L. REV. 175, 190 (1967).
33. It appears that the Court foresaw no new trials for habeas corpus
petitioners sentenced as Witherspoon was. Rejecting arguments that give
only prospective application to its ruling, the Court stated that the "impact
of a retroactive holding on the administration of justice" did not preclude
giving retroactive effect to Witherspoon. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 523 n.22 (1968). The Court cited Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
(1966), in which it had decided against applying Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), retroactively, having
concluded that to do so "would seriously disrupt the administration of our
criminal laws. It would require the retrial or release of numerous prisoners
found guilty by trustworthy evidence .
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S.
719, 731 (1966) (emphasis added).
28. C.
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tions which have bifurcated trial procedures, new penalty trials.
Such cases should be rare, however, since it is unlikely that
judges will sustain challenges for cause on the basis of conscientious scruples now that the United States Supreme Court and
the Louisiana legislature 4 have spoken. The factors which make
a second trial for a habeas corpus petitioner potentially hazardous
for the state are not likely to be present at the second trial of
a defendant who has appealed and is retried shortly afterward.
It should be noted, however, that although the United States
Supreme Court in Witherspoon refused to hold that exclusion
of prospective jurors conscientiously opposed to the death penalty
results in a jury prejudiced on the issue of guilt,85 the Court
has not foreclosed the possibility of such a holding in the future. 86
Courts which grant new trials for violations of the new constitutional rule may, therefore, be following a wise course.
Larry C. Becnel
THE RIGHTS OF THE VENDOR IN REDHIBITION

The Louisiana Civil Code, while dealing extensively with
the buyer's rights, is practically silent concerning the rights of
the seller in a successful redhibitory action. Since each of the
parties to a sale would like to be able to predict the legal consequences flowing from their transaction, the extent of liability
and the available remedies are of utmost importance to the
vendor. If a vendor sells a thing with redhibitory defects, three
situations can arise. First, the thing can be defective to the point
of total uselessness, in which case the total avoidance of the sale
provides a fair remedy for both parties. Being totally defective,
neither would the thing be capable of producing fruits nor would
it have any use value for the buyer; therefore, the seller would
34. IA. CODE CRIM. P.

art. 798 was amended after the Witherspoon deci-

sion and it is no longer permissible to challenge prospective jurors for cause
simply because they express conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment. La. Acts 1968, E.S., No. 13, § 1.
35. The Court again rejected the "prosecution-prone" theory In Bumper
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968).

36. The Court said: "We simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of
the record now before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative
jury on the issue of guilt ....

Witherspoon .v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18

1968) (emphasis added).
Justice Black, dissenting, said: "For the majority opinion goes out of
its way to state that in some future case a defendant might well establish
that a jury selected in the way the Illinois statute here provides is 'less than
neutral with respect to guilt.'" Id. at 539 (emphasis in the original.)

